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LONG LIVE THE DEAD HAND: A CASE FOR REPEAL OF
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN WASHINGTON
Keith L. Butler
Abstract. The common law rule against perpetuities has had a storied career spanning
several centuries and two legal systems. The rule developed to curb the concentration of
wealth in the hands of a few, and to limit the control of property by those no longer alive to
use it. Legendary for its complexity, the rule has undergone statutory reform in many states;
some states have gone so far as to repeal the rule outright. Washington has embraced two of
the major reforms of the rule and is considering repeal. This Comment argues that the rule,
even with reform, no longer serves the policies for which it was designed. The threats posed
by "dead hand control" are no longer pressing, and extant legal mechanisms are adequate to
deal with the threats that remain. Reform is too mild a response to the rule's shortcomings.
Washington, therefore, should repeal the rule.
If there should be among our rules one which is so abstruse that it is
misunderstood by a substantial percentage of those who advise the
public, so unrealistic that its "conclusive presumptions" are
laughable nonsense to any sane [person], so capricious that it
strikes down in the name of public order gifts which offer no
offense except that they are couched in the wrong words, so
misapplied that it sometimes directly defeats the end it was
designed to further-then... we should take corrective action.'
Barton Leach offered this criticism of the rule against perpetuities
while discussing the case of Ward v. Van der Loeff,2 in which the British
House of Lords invalidated the codicil3 to an uncle's will revoking a gift
to his nephews and nieces because the codicil violated the rule.4 The rule
addresses contingent property interests and limits the amount of time
such interests may remain contingent.' The point of this limitation is to
prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a powerful few and
1. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 721,722 (1952).
2. 1924 App. Cas. 653 (appeal taken from C.A.).
3. A codicil is "[a] supplement of addition to a will, not necessarily disposing of the entire estate
but modifying, explaining of otherwise qualifying the will in some way." Black's Law Dictionary
251 (7th ed. 1999).
4. See Ward, 1924 App. Cas. at 653.
5. See Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 834 (5th ed. 1995).
See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of how long is too long according to
the rule.
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mitigate the extent to which those no longer alive can restrict the use of
property and thereby limit its productive use.6 In Ward, the validity of
the codicil was contingent upon the total number of the uncle's parents'
children Although the uncle's parents were both sixty-seven years old
when the uncle died, Lord Dunedin held that it was at least possible that
the parents, in spite of their age, would have further children.8 As a
result, the property interests described in the codicil might have remained
contingent for a longer period than the rule allowed. This violation of the
rule meant that the codicil was void at its inception.9 Those who expected
to receive substantial property interests from the codicil instead received
nothing. l
Because of cases like Ward, the rule has been described as "a
technicality-ridden legal nightmare"'" that conceals numerous traps for
estate planners.' 2 For that reason, the rule has become the target of the
"corrective actions" that Leach called for almost fifty years ago. 3 While
many states have taken Leach's suggestion that the rule be reformed, 4
some states have seriously curtailed or repealed the rule outright. 5
Washington has embraced two of the major reforms of the common law
rule 6 and is considering repeal. 7
6. See infra Part I.C.2.
7. See Ward, 1924 App. Cas. at 653.
8. See id. at 654, 667.
9. See id. at 670.
10. See id. at 680.
11. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349, 1349
(1954).
12. For a summary of the hidden difficulties in complying with the rule, see Dukeminier &
Johanson, supra note 5, at 837-46.
13. See Leach, supra note 1 at 745-49.
14. See generally Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 876-97.
15. There are nine jurisdictions that have either seriously curtailed or repealed the rule. See Alaska
Stat. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 2000); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-2901(a) (2000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, §
503(a) (1998); Idaho Code § 55-111 (1999); 765 Il1. Comp. Stat. 305/1-5 (West 2000); Md. Code
Ann., Est. & Trusts § 11-102(2) (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2131.09(B)(1) (West 1999); S.D.
Codified Laws §§ 43-5-1, -8 (Michie 2000); Wis. Stat. § 700.16 (1999).
16. See infra at Part II.D (discussing cy pres approach and wait-and-see approach); see also Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 11.98.130, .150 (2000).
17. See Memorandum from Michael D. Carrico, Chair, Washington State Rule Against
Perpetuities Reform Task Force (Jun. 4, 1999) (on file with author). There is a distinction between
repeal of Washington's statutory version of the rule, and the statutory declaration that the common
law rule is inoperable. Repeal of the statutory version of the rule would leave the common law rule
intact. Thus, to rid the State of the rule altogether it is necessary to couple repeal of the statute with
1238
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This Comment argues that Washington should repeal the statutory rule
and declare the common law rule inoperable for two reasons. First, the
rule, even with reform, does not effectively prevent wealth concentration
or limit restrictions that impair the productive use of property. Second,
like other states, Washington has developed other legal mechanisms that
respond to these threats more directly and efficiently. Part I of this
Comment explicates the common law rule, traces its development from
seventeenth-century England, articulates its principal justifications, and
presents the major approaches to statutory reform, including the
approaches adopted in Washington. Part II examines extant legal
mechanisms aimed at achieving the same results as the rule. Part III
advances three related arguments favoring repeal of the rule: First, extant
legal mechanisms adequately serve the policies the rule was designed to
address; second, the rule does not adequately serve those policies; third,
the policies driving reform of the rule are ill-conceived in ways that
highlight the benefits of repeal of the rule. This Comment concludes that
reform is too mild a response to the troubles plaguing the common law
rule. The creation of contingent interests in property should not be
constrained by a bright-line rule. Rather, the law should invoke more
reactive mechanisms to invalidate such interests only when necessary to
avoid adverse social and economic consequences.
I. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Because the rule serves as an indirect limit on the duration of trusts, 8
it is helpful to begin with an examination of trusts and their relation to
the rule. This understanding will permit a detailed explication of the rule,
as well as an examination of the history of the rule and the motivations
driving its development. This section concludes with a discussion of
prominent statutory reforms of the common law rule.
A. Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities
A trust is a property interest held by one person, the trustee, at the
request of another, the settlor, for the benefit of yet another, the
enactment of a substitute that does not simply return Washington to the pre-statutory common law
rule. See id.
18. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 662.
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beneficiary. 9 Although settlors can create trusts for many reasons, ° they
are often created gratuitously for the benefit of private parties.2' Such
trusts may be testamentary (created by will) or inter vivos (created
during the lifetime of the settlor).22 Parents who wish to provide for their
children and grandchildren, for example, may choose to place property in
a trust for the benefit of their offspring and subsequent descendants. By
placing the property in trust, rather than giving it to the children and
grandchildren outright, parents may provide for their children while at
the same time minimizing certain risks to the family fortune.23 One such
risk involves the future management and disposition of family property;
by placing their property in trust, parents may protect the property from
mismanagement in the hands of children who are either not yet capable
of sound fiscal judgment or who for other reasons lack sufficient
business acumen.24
Although trusts are often benign and beneficial, the law has long
recognized that they present potential problems to society. Ambitious
settlors may wish to use trusts to maintain ownership of property and
other forms of wealth within a single family for long periods of time.25
This use may give rise to consequences detrimental to society, such as
the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few26 and the unproductive
use of property27; it also takes control of property and other assets out of
the hands of those who will subsequently use them. 28
The law's initial response to these risks was the rule against
perpetuities. According to the classic statement of the common law rule,
no future interest in real or personal property is permitted unless it must
vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after the end of some life in being
at the creation of the interest2 9 A future interest in property is one where
19. See id. at 565.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 834 (citing Arthur Hobhouse, The Dead Hand 188 (1880)).
25. See, e.g., Joseph Singer, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 590 (2d ed. 1997).
26. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
29. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 827 (citing John Chipman Gray, The Rule
Against Perpetuities § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942)). Although the use of the term "life in being" in this
expression of the rule does not itself so indicate, the perpetuities period is determined by reference to
1240
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possession or enjoyment of the property must wait until some future
time.3" Such an interest vests when one has a fixed or absolute right in
the property (even if possession and enjoyment of the property must wait
until some future time)."' Under the rule, a trust creating a future interest
in property must be such that future interests in the property become
fixed rights within a finite amount of time, called the perpetuities
period;32 that period is specified by reference to the lifespan of someone
alive when the trust was created, plus twenty-one years.3 It is possible
for a trust to endure beyond the perpetuities period, so long as a fixed
right in the trust property is created within the perpetuities period.34
Because the rule has the effect of terminating trusts within a finite
amount of time, it mitigates social costs associated with long-term trusts,
such as the accumulation of wealth and the unproductive use of
property.35 The rule also balances the rights of present generations to
control their assets against the rights of subsequent generations to control
the assets they use.36
B. Explication of the Rule Against Perpetuities
According to the common law rule, if an interest must vest or
unequivocally fail to vest within the perpetuities period, then the interest
does not violate the rule.37 Suppose, for example, that in her will S leaves
in trust $50,000 to her childless son B, to be distributed upon S's death if
B is alive at that time, and $100,000 to each of B's children, if he should
have any, to be distributed on their twentieth birthdays. These interests
must each vest or fail to vest during B's lifetime, plus twenty-one years.
B's $50,000 interest will plainly vest within B's lifetime, or if he dies, it
the lifespan of someone who can affect vesting of the interest (as opposed to someone irrelevant to
the interest), and who was alive when the interest was created. See id. This is a validating or
measuring life, that is, someone alive at the creation of the interest within whose lifespan the
contingent interest becomes a fixed interest. See, e.g., Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 836.
30. See Black's Law Dictionary 685 (7th ed. 1999).
31. See id. at 1557.
32. Cf Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 4, at 835.
33. See id. at 590.
34. See id. at 835.
35. See id at 833.
36. See George Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 19, 46 (1977).
37. See John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
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will fail to vest immediately upon his death. If B dies never having had
any children, then the $100,000 interest B's children would have had will
have failed to vest during his lifetime and therefore lapse. If B does have
children, then the $100,000 interest will have vested within B's lifetime
plus twenty-one years. Because there is no possibility of the interest
vesting later than twenty-one years after B's life, the interest is valid
under the common law rule.
By contrast, if there is even a remote possibility that an interest will
vest after the perpetuities period has run, then the interest is void from
the start. 8 Suppose, for instance, that S also included provisions for B's
grandchildren. Because there is a distinct possibility that a child of B's
might be born after the trust is created, it is possible that the
grandchildren's interests would vest later than twenty-one years after all
persons living at the creation of the trust have died. Under the common
law rule, the grandchildren's interest would be void at its creation.
C. Development of the Rule Against Perpetuities
The rule is a product of British common law. Scholars have extracted
from myriad cases three related policies the rule was initially intended to
serve.39 The first policy appeals to principles of social justice, the second
is based on economic analyses, and the third is grounded in individual
rights.
1. How the Rule Developed
Although the rule received its classical expression by John Chipman
Gray in 1942,40 its common law roots extend at least back to seventeenth-
century England,4 and possibly earlier.42 Land was once the principal
38. See id.
39. Among those contributing to discussions about the policies behind the rule are Dukeminier &
Johanson, supra note 5, at 833; Everett Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuilies, 6
Minn. L. Rev. 560 (1922); Donna P. Grill, Perpetuities Reform: A Signal From West Virginia, 11
Real Est. L.J. 116 (1982); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1124 (1960); Philip Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities
Legislation, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 965 (1959); and Lewis Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103
U. Pa. L. Rev. 707 (1955).
40. See supra note 36, § 201, at 91.
41. See Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 931 (Ch. 1682).
42. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 827-32.
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form of wealth,43 and the landed gentry of England often sought to
convey land to heirs with restrictions on alienability to prevent the land
from being sold outside the family." Almost from the outset, however,
judges were reluctant to allow testators to tie up land forever with
restrictions that might allow it to deteriorate and become unproductive
(for example, unusable for farming).45 After struggling for centuries to
define a period during which it was acceptable for the dead hand to
control, English courts finally settled in 1833 on a life in being plus
twenty-one years.46
The rule developed in an era when wealth, power, and social status
were bound up intimately with land ownership.47 Governments quickly
recognized that it was against the interests of society to allow
unrestrained "dead hand control" of property48 to tie up land and promote
accumulation in the hands of a wealthy few.49 At the same time,
however, courts recognized some right of testators to influence
inheritance; under the English system of primogeniture, the first-born son
had a right to the family estate upon the father's death."0 The eldest son,
however, was not necessarily gifted with the real-estate acumen needed
to maintain the property, so the need arose to protect the family estate
from incompetent sons who could squander it.5 Courts granted
England's landowning elite the legal authority to withhold inheritance in
order to give fathers the opportunity to determine whether their sons
could competently maintain the family estate; if the father believed that
the eldest son was incapable of maintaining the estate, he could bequeath
the estate to another child or relative.52 The authority to withhold
inheritance, however, did not extend to the assessment of unborn
43. See id.
44. See Singer, supra note 25, at 533.
45. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 828.
46. See Cadell v. Palmer, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (1832, 1833).
47. See Singer, supra note 25, at 527.
48. "Dead hand control" is a term used to describe the control of property by a settlor, the settlor's
"dead hand" places restrictions on property through the terms of the trust. Cf Haskins, supra note
36, at 46.
49. See Leonard Levin & Michael Mulroney, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Generation-
Skipping Tax: Do We Need Both?, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 333, 333 (1990).
50. See James S. Chase, Perpetuity Reform: How Much Do We Need?, 11 Prob. L.J. 1, 2-3
(1992).
51. Seeid.
52. See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1055-56 (1987).
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children.53 Thus, there was a limit on the father's ability to control
inheritance. This limit was eventually extended to twenty-one years
beyond those living at the time of the bequest.54
2. Why the Rule Developed
The first type of rationale for the rule appeals to notions of social
justice. One problem that the rule addresses is the "threat to the public
welfare from family dynasties built either on great landed estates or on
great capital wealth."55 The accumulation of wealth by family dynasties
deprives those outside the settlors' circle of beneficiaries from gaining
access to the property controlled by the families, which limits outsiders'
opportunities for economic prosperity.56 The rule helps to prevent such
dynasties from enduring in perpetuity by limiting the extent to which a
greedy settlor may require land and wealth to remain within a single
family." Although this argument favoring the rule also has economic
58elements, it is mainly an argument from basic principles of fairness: If
vast amounts of property and wealth are in the hands of the few, and it
can be made to remain there simply by the greed of a few dead hands,
then the rest of society is forever disadvantaged. 9 While everyone may
enjoy equality under the law, not everyone would enjoy economic
equality.6"
53. See id. at 1056.
54. See id.
55. Leach, supra note 1, at 727.
56. Cf Singer, supra note 25, at 590.
57. See Leach, supra note 1, at 727. Suppose S accumulates vast amounts of real property that she
leaves in trust to B for life on the condition that B not sell the property outside the family, with a
remainder to B's children for life on the same condition, and so on. If S's trust could endure in
perpetuity, no one else would ever have the opportunity to acquire this land. If B's heirs add to such
an estate with the same restrictions, S's family could conceivably come to own everything. Or,
similarly, suppose S leaves a fund in trust for the benefit of B without giving B access to the
principal, then to B's children with the same restriction, and so on. As this principal is invested and
grows, more and more wealth accumulates in the trust. If S's heirs add to the principal in a similar
manner, S's family may come to control all wealth.
58. It would be bad for economic development to have so much property in the hands of so few.
See, e.g., Simes, supra note 39, at 709.
59. See id.
60. See Leach, supra note 1, at 727.
1244
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The problem of private wealth accumulation i.s analogous to the
problem of monopolies addressed by antitrust laws.6 When one
company captures vast amounts of market share, the lack of serious
competition allows the monopolizing company to control prices.62 The
disadvantage to the public is not unlike that arising when a single
wealthy individual controls vast amounts of land and other wealth. Those
who want or need access to that property must capitulate to the desires of
the owner just as customers must pay the price charged by the
monopolizing company.6' The rule exists to prevent this noncommercial
wealth accumulation from wreaking havoc analogous to that wrought by
corporate monopolies.
A second type of rationale for the rule is essentially economic.
Through the use of trusts, the dead hand can impinge on current and
future generations' ability to control property,' which in turn can impair
the alienability' and productivity of property.66 Apart from using explicit
trust terms to prohibit sale, the dead hand may make trust property
inalienable indirectly by placing restrictions on the use of the property,
or by creating uncertainty about when and in whom future property
interests will vest.67 Dead hand restrictions discourage potential buyers
by preventing them from developing the property as they see fit;
uncertainties discourage potential buyers because they do not know who
will have claims on the property, how sizable their claims are, whether it
is possible to buy out these interests, nor how much a buyout would
cost.68 If, for these reasons, trust property cannot be sold, other terms of
the trust, or the lack of trust resources, may prevent the property from
being developed to economic advantage.69 The result may be that the
property can neither be sold nor put to productive use.70 The rule blocks
61. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its
Practice 12-36 (1994), for a discussion of the problems posed by market monopolies.
62. See id. at 12.
63. See id.
64. See Haskins, supra note 36, at 46.
65. The alienation of property is its transfer from one to another, often by sale. See Black's Law
Dictionary 73 (7th ed. 1999).
66. See, e.g., Brian Layman, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerfid Tools in the
Estate Planner's Arsenal, 32 Akron L. Rev. 747, 749 (1992).
67. See Simes, supra note 39, at 710.
68. See Singer, supra note 25, at 590.
69. See id.
70. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 833.
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these undesirable economic consequences by invalidating the interests
that could vest after the perpetuities period has run.7
A third type of argument is rooted in basic principles of individual
rights. According to one source, the rule aims to strike "a fair balance
between the desires of members of the present generation, and similar
desires of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property
which they enjoy. ' 72 Thus, on the one hand is the maxim that the current
generation has the right to control the property they enjoy,73 and on the
other hand is the right of testators to do with their property what they
wish.74 The rule exists to balance these competing rights.7 ' The testator's
hand gets to control the distribution of wealth for some time after death,
but at some point the rights of the living pry trust assets and property
from the dead hand's grip. The claim made by the rule's proponents,
usually without argument, is that the perpetuities period is the right
compromise between the competing rights of the dead and the living.76
D. Reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities
The common law rule is often difficult to apply because it requires the
estate planner to rule out exceedingly remote possibilities. The fertile
octogenarian,77 the precocious toddler,78 the unborn widow,79 the slothful
7 1. See Singer, supra note 25, at 590.
72. Simes, supra note 39, at 723.
73. See David M. Becker, If You Think You No Longer Need to Know Anything About the Rule
Against Perpetuities, Then Read This!, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 713, 714 (1996).
74. See Singer, supra note 25, at 525.
75. See Simes, supra note 39, at 723.
76. See Ira Mark Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There is an Alternative, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 23,
26(1987).
77. Under the rule, courts must presume that any living person is capable of having or fathering
children, no matter how old they are. See Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, 1187 (1787). Thus, the
rule strikes down any interest whose vesting depends on the assertion that, for example,
octogenarians will not have children. See id.
78. Under the rule, courts must presume that living persons are capable of having or fathering
children, no matter how young they are. See In re Graite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459, 460
(Ch.). Thus, the rule strikes down any interest whose vesting depends on the assertion that, for
example, a toddler will not have children. See id.
79. Under the rule, courts must presume that one could be succeeded by a widow who is not yet
born. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 595 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Ark. 1980). Thus, the rule
strikes down any interest whose vesting depends upon one's widow being alive at the creation of the
interest. See id.
1246
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executor,8" the magic gravel pit,"' the war that never ends,82 and the
exploding birthday present," all may pose problems for an estate
planner. Each reflects a remote possibility that could delay the vesting of
a contingent interest beyond the perpetuities period.
The difficulties in applying the rule have motivated reform
movements." Because of the myriad possibilities that can invalidate a
will or trust under the rule, it is not uncommon to find out many years
after an instrument has been created that it contains a perpetuities
violation." As a consequence, many intended beneficiaries have been
shocked to find out only upon their benefactor's death that the interests
they were promised are void under the rule.86 Such consequences led to
malpractice suits filed against drafters who failed to negotiate adequately
the rule's subtle terrain.87 Some courts, however, found that a perpetuities
violation is a mistake too understandable and easy to make to qualify as
professional malpractice.88 This concession that the rule is too opaque set
the stage for statutory reforms that aim to preserve the rule's ability to
reach its goals while avoiding the labyrinth of possibilities that befuddled
estate planners.
Three non-exclusive approaches to reform have developed. The cy
pres approach borrows from the legal doctrine applying to charitable
80. Under the rule, courts must presume that one's executor could fail to probate one's will within
21 years after one's death. See, e.g., Estate of Garrett, 94 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1953). Thus, the rule
strikes down any interest whose vesting depends on probating the will within the perpetuities period.
See id
81. Under the rule, courts must presume that any gravel pit (or analogous commodity-producing
asset) could remain productive well beyond the perpetuities period. See, e.g., In re Wood, [1894] 3
Ch. 381, 381. Thus, the rule will strike down any interest whose vesting depends on the exhaustion
of the commodity-producing asset. See id.
82. Under the rule, courts must presume that a war could last well beyond the perpetuities period.
See, e.g., Brownell v. Edmunds, 209 F.2d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 1953). Thus, the rule will strike down
any interest whose vesting depends on the completion of the war. See id.
83. Under the rule, courts must presume that one reaches 21 at the first moment of the day before
one's birthday (this is because one is in existence on the day of one's birth, and that on the day
before one's first birthday one has completed one year). See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5,
at 846. Thus, any interest that vests when one reaches one's twenty-first birthday could violate the
rule by one day. See id.
84. See Olin Browder, Jr., Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1963); Leach, supra note 1, at 721.
85. See Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 595 S.W.2d 677,681 (Ark. 1980).
86. See Ward v. Van der Loeff, 1924 App. Cas. 653, 680 (appeal taken from C.A.).
87. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961).
88. See id
1247
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trusts." A charitable trust is one set up for the benefit of a charitable
organization.9" When a charitable trust contains unenforceable
restrictions, such as racially discriminatory restrictions, courts have
recast the trust's terms to conform to the law, but in a way that is as close
as possible to the settlor's general charitable intent.9 For private trusts in
violation of the rule, courts using the cy pres approach to perpetuities
reform have recast trusts containing violations of the rule to conform to
the rule in a way that most closely approximates the settlor's intent.92
Many trusts now contain savings clauses, which explicitly require cy
pres modification of trust terms if the trust (as written) violates the rule.93
The wait-and-see approach to reform eliminates the rule's focus on
possible ways that contingent interests might remain unvested beyond
the perpetuities period by invalidating interests only if they actually
remain unvested beyond the perpetuities period.94 Much of the trouble
with the common law rule involves the innumerable and hopelessly
abstract possibilities that might cause a future interest to vest after the
close of the perpetuities period.95 Under the wait-and-see approach, rule-
violating possibilities that do not come about do not affect the validity of
the instrument.96 Only those possibilities that actually cause an interest to
vest after the perpetuities period has run affect the validity of the
instrument.97 If an unvested interest remains after the perpetuities period
has run, then the relevant portion of the trust can either be invalidated or
brought into conformity with the rule and distributed under the cy pres
approach.98
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) adopts the
wait-and-see approach, but stipulates a wait-and-see period of ninety
years; if an interest actually vests within ninety years of the effective date
of the instrument, that portion of the instrument that created it is valid.99
89. Cf Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 876.
90. See Black's Law Dictionary 1514 (7th ed. 1999).
91. See Singer, supra note 25, at 558-59.
92. This approach was first taken up in Edgerly v. Barker, 31 A. 900, 915 (N.H. 1891), and more
recently in cases such as Berry v. Union National Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766, 770-71 (W. Va. 1980).
93. Cf Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809 n.2 (1975).
94. Support for the wait-and-see approach is found in Leach, supra note 1, at 728-30.
95. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
96. See Singer, supra note 25, at 595.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 595.
99. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-901(a)(2) (1999)
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It is sometimes difficult to determine all the relevant lives-in-being and
hence difficult to determine the precise extent of the common law
perpetuities period.' The ninety-year period obviates the need to wrestle
with this problem. The perpetuities period is not calculated by an obscure
formula; it is simply stipulated to be ninety years.'0 '
Washington embraces elements of both the wait-and-see and cy pres
reforms.'0 2 Washington's waiting period is set at beneficiaries' lives-in-
being plus twenty-one years.'0 3 Trust interests that vest before the end of
this perpetuities period are distributed to the beneficiaries, even if there
had been some remote possibility that the interests could have vested
later."° If there are unvested interests at the end of the perpetuities
period, courts will use the cy pres doctrine to distribute the assets with
due attention paid to the intent of the settlor.0 5
The various perpetuities reform movements have not been without
controversy. Each new proposal or defense of a proposal has been
greeted with one or more heated retorts.0 6 No real consensus has
emerged regarding the direction and emphasis that perpetuities reform
should take.'0 7
100. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
101. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 887.
102. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 11.98.130-.150 (2000).
103. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.98.130.
104. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.98.140.
105. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.98.150.
106. The following sequence of exchanges between Jesse Dukeminier and Lawrence Waggoner is
illustrative: Lawrence F. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1718 (1983); Jesse
Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1648 (1985); Lawrence F.
Waggoner, Perpetuides: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1714 (1985); Jesse
Dukeminier, A Response by Professor Dukeminier, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1730 (1985); Lawrence F.
Waggoner, A Rejoinder by Professor Waggoner, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1739 (1985); Jesse Dukeminier,
A Final Comment by Professor Dukeminier, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1742 (1985); Dukeminier, supra
note 52, at 1023; and Lawrence F. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 157 (1988). Commentators in
Washington have also joined the flay. See Bloom, supra note 76; Susan F. French, Perpetuities:
Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 323 (1990); Robert L. Fletcher, Perpetuities:
A Father's Reply, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 357 (1990).
107. See supra note 106.
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II. EXTANT MECHANISMS LIMITING DEAD HAND CONTROL
AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION
The rule is not the only legal mechanism designed to curb dead hand
control and wealth concentration. Other legal mechanisms aimed at
achieving the same results include federal taxes, the powers and duties of
trustees, and marketable-title acts.
A. Federal Taxes Limit Wealth Concentration
Three chapters in the Internal Revenue Code tax the various ways an
individual might distribute his or her assets. The federal estate tax
generally targets transfers of interest in property occasioned by the death
of the property's owner;"08 if one transfers wealth in a will effective upon
one's death, the estate tax may claim a substantial portion of the assets." 9
The federal gift tax targets inter vivos gifts;"' if one attempts to avoid
the estate tax by transferring one's assets well before one approaches
death, the gift tax may claim a substantial portion of the assets."' The
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax targets generation-skipping
transfers," 2 whether or not such transfers are subject to the estate or gift
108. See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (1999). One's taxable estate is determined by subtracting certain
deductions from one's gross estate. See Richard Stephens et al., Federal Estate & Gift
Taxation $ 1.02, at 1-2 (1991). The gross estate consists of property owned at death, together with
other property more or less artificially included in one's gross estate. See id. This other property
includes property transferred near death, property transferred where the transferor retains enjoyment
of the property, property transferred where the transfer is conditioned upon survival of the transferor,
property transferred revocably, joint-and-survivor annuities, jointly held property, property where
one has a general power of appointment that includes the power to appoint property to oneself, life
insurance, and qualifying terminable-interest property. See id. There are various credits used in
computing the estate tax, the most important of which is the unified credit, which exempts from
taxation the first $675,000 of the estate, provided the credit was not used in offsetting one's gift tax.
See id. $ 3.02, at 3-3.
109. See I.R.C. § 2001(a).
110. See I.R.C. § 2503 (1999). An inter vivos gift, made during the lifetime of the donor, should
be contrasted with a testementary gift, made by will upon the death of the donor. See Black's Law
Dictionary 697 (7th ed. 1999). Almost any gratuitous shifting of financial resources from one to
another may constitute a gift for tax purposes. See Stephens et al., supra note 108, 1.03, at 1-18
(1991). The gift-tax provision includes a $10,000 per donee annual exclusion, which allows a large
amount of wealth to pass to family members each year free of tax. See Boris Bittker & Elias Clark,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 13 (1990). There are also deductions for gifts to charities and
spouses. See Stephens et al., supra note 108, $ 1.03, at 1-24. The unified credit, exempting $675,000
from taxes, also applies to the gift tax. See id. at 1-26.
111. See I.R.C. § 2502 (1999).
112. See generally I.R.C. § 2611 (1999).
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taxes;" 3 if one attempts to avoid both the estate and gift taxes by creating
a trust for the benefit of subsequent generations, the GST tax may claim
a substantial portion of the assets." 4 Because most wealth today is in the
form of financial assets rather than real property, these taxes are effective
ways of controlling wealth accumulation." 5
For trust wealth that is not exempted from these taxes, the graduated
tax structure is particularly effective in controlling excessive wealth
accumulation; the greater the amount of accumulated wealth the greater
the taxes imposed on each kind of conveyance. "6 Because estate and
GST taxes can climb to a rate of fifty-five percent for very large
accumulations of wealth,'17 it is difficult for wealth that is passed on
from generation to generation to accumulate beyond a certain level. Any
wealth that does grow considerably during a given generation would be
taxed at the maximum rate upon transfer."' This taxation reduces the
amount retained significantly and therefore curbs the threat of wealth
concentration.1 9 Taxes, then, represent one way to curtail excessive
accumulations of wealth, as well as some of the attendant effects of dead
hand control, independently of the rule.
B. Trustee Duties and Powers Limit Dead Hand Control
Apart from the federal constraints on dead hand control through taxes,
other constraints reside in the powers and duties of trustees in the
management of trust assets. Trustees generally must act in the interest of
beneficiaries, yet within the constraints laid down by the settlor 20
Nonetheless, courts can give trustees the power to dispose of trust assets
even if a settlor forbids it, if the disposition is in the interest of the
beneficiaries.'' Settlors' dead hand constraints act as defeasible con-
113. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662 (1999).
114. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662.
115. See G. Graham Waite, The Practitioner's Corner: Let's Abolish the Rule Against Perpet-
uities, 21 Real Est. L.J. 93, 96 (1992).
116. See Leach, supra note 1, at 727.
117. See I.R.C. § 2001 (c).
118. See Leach, supra note 1, at 727.
119. Seeid.
120. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 905.
121. See generally Simes, supra note 39, at 713; see also Wash. Rev. Code § 11.100.040 (2000)
(allowing court to permit trustee to deviate from terms of trust instrument relating to "acquisition,
investment, reinvestment, exchange, retention, sale, or management of fiduciary property").
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ditions on trust management; they can be defeated when economic
conditions clearly warrant such actions. 2 2 For example, if it is clear that
stocks in a trust will continue to decrease in value, the trustee can request
a court to allow the trustee to step in and sell the stocks to preserve the
value of the beneficiaries' interests.
C. Marketable-Title Acts Obviate Problems Associated with Enduring
Trusts
Marketable-title acts, which now exist in many states, address one
type of problem that would arise in the absence of the rule. If trusts could
endure in perpetuity, someone interested in purchasing property held in
trust might be obligated to search far back into the past to determine
precisely the restrictions placed on the use or ownership of the land."2
Even if all information about the tract is located, there might be
substantial uncertainty about just what restrictions one is buying into.
This, in turn, would deter potential purchasers.' 24 The rule prevents this
problem from arising by preventing long-term trusts, 125 but is not the
only legal mechanism capable of eliminating this sort of problem. 2 6
Marketable-title acts place limits on how far back one must go in a title
search to determine who has an interest in the property.'27 If descendants
of an original dead hand settlor do not update the settlor's intent
periodically, a marketable-title act will dictate that the settlor's
restrictions-including beneficiary interests in the property-have
lapsed. 128 Independently of the rule, marketable-title acts remove much of
the difficulty in securing clean title to real property, thereby solving the
problem of uncertainty concerning legal title to real property and the
resulting inalienability.'29
122. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.100.040; Simes, supra note 39, at 713.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Singer, supra note 25, at 596.
126. See id.
127. Cf id. Washington currently has no marketable-title act.
128. See id.
129. See Waite, supra note 115, at 96.
1252
Vol. 75:1237, 2000
Rule Against Perpetuities
III. A CASE FOR REPEAL OF THE RULE
The case for repeal of the rule consists in three broad lines of
argument. First, the rule is no longer necessary because the threats
addressed by the rule are no longer pressing, and because extant legal
mechanisms render the rule unnecessary to prevent the social and
economic problems it was originally developed to alleviate. Second, the
rule inadequately serves the policies it was developed to serve. Third, the
policies undergirding reform of the rule are ill-conceived in ways that
highlight the benefits of repeal. Washington, therefore, should repeal the
rule.
A. Extant Legal Mechanisms that Curb Dead Hand Control and
Wealth Concentration Render the Rule Unnecessary
Changes in economic conditions have mitigated the need for the rule.
Extant legal mechanisms, such as federal taxes, trustee duties and
powers, and marketable-title acts, respond adequately to the threats that
remain.
1. The Threats to Which the Rule Responded Are Largely Absent
Today
The modem United States differs in several respects from
seventeenth-century England. As a result of these differences, the
problems of dead hand control and wealth concentration no longer justify
the rule's harsh response. The viability of the rule must be judged against
the economic landscape of twenty-first-century America. The need for
the rule has diminished because the threats the rule addressed are, if not
eliminated, at least significantly reduced.
First, the threat to economic and social equality posed by family
dynasties no longer looms large.'30 Land is more plentiful in the United
States than in England and the government has set aside enormous tracts
of it for public use.'3' Therefore, there is little risk that people will be
130. Cf supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
131. The Public Use Statistics Office of the National Park Service reports that protected national
lands (for example, national parks, national monuments, national historical sites) totaled
83,641,123.86 acres in 1999; these areas were used by 286,739,115 people during 1998, the most
recent year for which statistics were reported. See National Park Serv. (visited Feb. 9, 2000)
<http://www2.nature.nps.gov/stats>.
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systematically deprived of land for private development and public
enjoyment. The vast expanse of this country makes it highly unlikely that
a single family could come to control enough land to put the rest of the
populace at a disadvantage.
Second, the economic assumptions underpinning the rule are no
longer applicable. 132 Most wealth in the United States today is not in the
form of land holdings. 133 Among the most affluent citizens, personal
wealth is overwhelmingly in the form of corporate stocks, government
bonds, and chattels, rather than real property; those who do own
substantial amounts of real property often do so for investment and
development, not for their own private use.' 34 Thus, the threat of land
monopolies is reduced simply because wealthy Americans are not aiming
to acquire land monopolies. This economic reality has several
implications. First, with a small amount of real estate held by the
wealthiest Americans, the threat of dead hand restraints on the
alienability of property is also reduced because the dead hands of
tomorrow will have comparatively little real property to restrict. Second,
the balancing of individual rights will also be much easier because dead
hands who control only limited amounts of property can make fewer
claims to restrict property used by the living. Moreover, corporations and
governments in whose stock wealthy Americans have invested control
significant amounts of property; if there is a burden of making this
property productive, it is a burden borne by corporations and
governments, not individuals. 3 5 Because the rule governs only.
individuals, it is of no help in this regard.'36
2. Extant Legal Mechanisms Can Protect Against Threats that Might
Arise Without the Rule
Federal taxes, fiduciary duties and powers, and marketable-title acts
together address what is left of the problems that prompted the
132. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
133. While the largest portion of household wealth is represented by home ownership, the
remaining asset types included shares in stocks and mutual funds, IRAs, and equity in personal
property such as cars. See T.J. Eller & Wallace Fraser, Asset Ownership of Households: 1993 Bureau
of the Census, Current Population Reports, P70-47 (visited Feb. 9, 2000)
<http://www.census.govlhhes/www/wealth.html>.
134. See Grill, supra note 39, at 117.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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development of the rule.'37 These legal mechanisms have in common the
feature of addressing the potential problems of dead hand control and
wealth concentration only when they become actual problems. These
mechanisms could shoulder the full responsibility for curbing any threats
of dead hand control and wealth concentration that remain.
a. Repeal of the Rule Would Encourage a Uniform Federal Tax
Solution to Wealth Accumulation
Federal taxes limit wealth accumulation,' but taxes provide only part
of the solution to the problems posed by, wealth accumulation. The
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax provisions, for example, allow an
exemption of up to $1 million for each individual who makes a
generation-skipping transfer.'39 All interest and appreciation of those
assets accruing after the exemption is taken are also exempt from the
GST tax. 40 Thus, a trust consisting of $1 million in GST tax-exempt
property could grow exponentially without ever being subject to any of
the federal tax provisions, no matter how large it becomes. 4' Without the
rule to put an end to this sort of dynasty trust, the trust could result in the
kind of wealth accumulation the rule is designed to prevent. Moreover,
another problem could arise: If one of these trusts persists for many
generations, the number of beneficiaries could grow exponentially. 42
The administrative difficulties attendant on such a growth in
beneficiaries would strangle trust management and sink the trust under
137. See supra Part II.
138. See supra Part II.A.
139. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 143 1(c), 100 Stat. 2085,2721 (1987).
140. See Levin & Mulroney, supra note 49, at 348 (citing Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 1265 (Joint Comm. Print
1987)).
141. See id. But see Unif. Probate Code § 2-900, at 224 (1999) (claiming, in context of 90 year
wait-and-see approach, that "[n]early all trusts... will terminate by their own terms long before the
90 year permissible vesting period expires").
142. According to a press release from the Uniform Law Commission (ULC),
Government statistics indicate that the average married couple has 2.1 children. Under this
assumption, the average settlor will have more than 100 descendants (who are beneficiaries of
the trust) 150 years after the trust is created, around 2,500 beneficiaries 250 years after the trust
is created, and 45,000 beneficiaries 350 years after the trust is created. Five hundred years after
the trust is created, the number of living beneficiaries could rise to an astounding 3.4 million.
Press Release, Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities is Law in 26
States: Move of a Few States to Abolish the Rule in Order to Facilitate Perpetual (Dynasty) Trusts is
Ill-Advised (Oct. 21, 1999) [hereinafter ULC Press Release].
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its own weight. 143 Thus, if there is a cogent argument to repeal the rule, it
must address the problem of the $1 million GST exemption.
Congress will likely solve the problem created by the GST exemption.
Indeed, the GST exemption runs contrary to the policy the GST tax is
intended to serve.1" Congress has a long history of favoring the use of
the tax system to prevent the excessive accumulation of wealth,
presumably for the same policy reasons driving the rule.'45 It is not
implausible to suppose that when Congress initially enacted the GST tax
in 1976, it was with the understanding that the rule, as codified in state
law, would act as a safety net to catch any trusts that threaten to balloon
out of control.'46 Indeed, the Senate Report on the 1976 Act stated that
"[c]urrently, all States (except Wisconsin and Idaho) have a rule against
perpetuities which limits the duration of a trust."'47 Therefore, it is no
less plausible to suppose that if states begin to repeal the rule, Congress
will eventually close the loophole created when the rule no longer blocks
dynasty trusts. Congress will either remove the exemption entirely, scale
it back significantly, or place some restriction on the size of trusts or the
number of beneficiaries; even those opposing repeal of the rule concede
that Congress will not allow any loophole created by repeal to last.'48
This way of dealing with dynasty trusts has the virtue of suggesting a
response to such trusts only if, or when, they present a problem. Unlike
the rule, which constitutes a cure for which there is not yet an ailment, 149
shifting the burden of responding to the threat of dynasty trusts to
Congress discourages the implementation of an unnecessary solution.
With Congress encouraged to address the problem through taxes, the
solution to the problem of dynasty trusts will be unified at the federal
level, and not composed of a patchwork of federal and state laws.
143. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987), for an example of the administrative
problems created when an asset has large numbers of beneficiaries.
144. See Levin & Mulroney, supra note 49, at 335-56.
145. An earlier Congress favored the collection of revenues "'from the incomes and inheritances
of those deriving the most benefit and protection from the Government."' See id. at 334 n.6 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 64-922, at 1 (1916)). A later Congress explicitly stated that the policy of taxing at
uniform rates, generation by generation is 'frustrated where the imposition of such taxes is deferred
for very long intervals . . . through the use of generation-skipping trusts."' See id. at 354 n.106
(quoting S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. 2, at 19 (1976)).
146. Cf id.
147. S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. 2, at 19; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
148. See ULC Press Release, supra note 142, where Professor Waggoner states that Congress will
close any loophole created by state abolition of the rule.
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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b. The Policy Favoring Live Hand Control Would Be Served Better
Without the Rule
Because trustees have both the duty to manage trusts in the interest of
beneficiaries, and the legal flexibility to contravene settlor restraints
when necessary, the rule is not needed to curb dead hand control. Courts
in Washington have the power to permit trustees to deviate from the
terms of trusts. 5a Thus, dead hand control is allowed to persist only so
long as it does no harm to beneficiaries or to society generally.' Even
without the rule, trustee duties and powers ensure that there is little
danger of trusts persisting to the detriment of beneficiaries and society.
Moreover, this way of dealing with dead hand control has the virtue of
suggesting a response to such control only if it presents a problem.
Unlike the rule, reliance on court-ordered modification of trusts
discourages a solution before there is a need for it.
The fact that trust property is alienable under certain circumstances
addresses an argument sometimes put forth in favor of the rule. 5 Many
have claimed that the rule serves the policy that it is better for the living
rather than the dead to control wealth.' This assumes that dead hand
control precludes live hand control, as if control of property were an all-
or-nothing affair. In fact, however, the dead hand may control some
aspects of trust property management, but the live hand of the trustee,
with aid perhaps from beneficiaries and courts, controls other aspects. 54
Thus, the policy favoring live hand control could be served just as well
without the rule; even trusts that endure in perpetuity would be governed
to a large extent by live hands.
C. Marketable-Title Acts Eliminate the Needfor Exhaustive Title
Searches After Repeal of the Rule
Washington should enact a marketable-title statute to deal with certain
problems that might arise if it repeals the rule. If trusts are allowed to
persist substantially longer than the perpetuities period, there is a threat
150. See supra note 121.
151. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
152. See French, supra note 106, at 352.
153. See Simes, supra note 39, at 708-12; see also Becker, supra note 73, at 713-14 n.4.
154. See French, supra note 106, at 352; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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that clean title to real property will be difficult to secure.155 To obviate
this consequence of repealing the rule, Washington could rely on
marketable-title acts, which stipulate that restrictions and property
interests that are not re-recorded periodically lapse; a search that turns up
no encumbrance within the most recent forty years, for example, would
be sufficient to establish a clean title.'56 Washington is not currently
among the states that have enacted marketable-title acts.'57 If Washington
repeals the rule, it should enact a marketable-title statute to prevent
problems in acquiring clean title to real property as a result of dead hand
restrictions that are allowed to persist in trusts no longer terminated by
the rule.
The foregoing considerations establish two points: First, the problems
of wealth accumulation and dead hand control are no longer pressing;
second, there are extant legal mechanisms capable of preventing such
problems and dealing with them when they arise. Federal taxes limit
wealth concentration, trustee duties and obligations can usurp dead hand
restrictions, and marketable-title acts prevent problems in securing clean
title to real property.
B. The Rule No Longer Serves Its Policy Goals Effectively
The rule prescribes the same type of limit on all trusts. Because this
limit is arbitrary, and because it is prescribed at the creation of the trust,
the rule may terminate trusts that continue to serve their intended
purpose without posing threats to society. Washington should repeal the
rule because it indiscriminately terminates beneficial trusts as well as
harmful trusts.
1. The Rule Prescribes an Arbitrary Limit on Trust Duration
Some commentators defend the rule on the ground that it strikes the
appropriate balance between the rights and interests of the dead and the
rights and interests of the living.'58 Arthur Hobhouse claimed that lives-
in-being plus twenty-one years is not simply an arbitrary limit on the
155. See supra Part II.C.
156. See id.
157. See supra note 127.
158. See Simes, supra note 39, at 723-25.
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reach of the dead hand.159 With this limit, settlors are able to reach
judgments about the distribution of their estates that are informed by an
understanding of the competence and needs of persons alive when the
judgments were made."6
This justification of the perpetuities period, however, is specious. A
judgment made while the beneficiary is quite young is about as
uninformed as one made before the beneficiary is born. Competence to
manage business affairs generally requires substantial training.'6 ' Indeed,
the law tends to embrace the idea that competence can only be
reasonably judged once a person reaches the age of majority. 62 Thus, the
mere fact that a beneficiary is alive is not sufficient to allow the settlor an
opportunity to judge the beneficiary's competence adequately. If the
duration set by the rule depends on the opportunity to judge competence,
it ought to be much shorter than it is: lives-in-being over the age of
twenty-two plus twenty-one years, or something to that effect. In light of
these considerations, the ninety-year stipulation of the USRAP fares even
worse; not only is its fixed period arbitrary, its duration almost
certainly would prevent a testator from judging the competence of
beneficiaries at the far reaches of the ninety-year period. Thus, with
respect to the Hobhouse justification," 4 the duration set by the rule is
entirely arbitrary.
More importantly, a judgment about competence in business affairs is
almost entirely irrelevant today. Trusts are now a common mechanism
for the distribution of wealth to offspring.6 5 Management of these assets
falls to the trustee, not the beneficiary. 6 6 Therefore, it does not matter
whether the settlor's son or daughter can be trusted not to squander the
159. See Arthur Hobhouse, The DeadHand 188 (1880).
160. See id.
161. College business degrees, for example, generally require four years of education after high
school. See, e.g., University of Washington Admissions Policy (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http:ll
www.washington.edu/studentsuga/fr/admission/policy.html>. Masters of Business Administration
degrees generally require two years of postgraduate study. See, e.g., University of Washington
Graduate Admissions (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.washington.edu/students/grad/
adminfo.html#requirements>.
162. People usually become subject to the adult criminal justice system, for example, only once
they have reached the age of 18. See, e.g., National Crime Prevention Ass'n (visited Feb. 9, 2000)
<http://www.ncpa.org/pi/crimetnov97f.html>.
163. See supra note 99.0
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
165. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 570-71.
166. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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family fortune; sons and daughters rarely have the opportunity to do so.
Thus, the Hobhouse justification for the duration of dead hand control
has almost no application to the trust-driven estate planning in the United
States today.
The rule is arbitrary in other respects as well. First, the rule's actual
effects are arbitrary. Among those wills and trusts that violate the rule,
only a limited number are detected, and of those, only some are
litigated. 167 It is therefore largely a matter of luck which violations
actually result in an invalid instrument. 61 Second, the rule affects only
contingent interests that remain unvested through the perpetuities
period. 169 The historical justification for this was that contingent interests
impaired alienability, while vested interests did not (at least not to the
same extent). 7 ° Now, however, most property is held in trust, and trust
property is alienable under appropriate conditions.' 7' Thus, there is no
reason for a rule that targets only contingent interests.
There is nothing particularly reasonable about the requirement that the
dead hand's judgment be given effect only for those living at the time the
dead hand creates a trust. Thus, setting the limit at lives-in-being plus
twenty-one years is arbitrary.
2. The Rule Terminates Trusts Independent of Their Actual
Consequences
Because the rule imposes its arbitrary limit on trusts in advance, even
if there is no threat of wealth accumulation or excessive dead hand
control, 172 it stands little chance of dealing with those threats effectively.
The perpetuities period is set without regard to future economic
conditions that might make it beneficial (or at least unharmful) for a trust
to persist past the perpetuities period. Thus, the rule operates blindly;
when the perpetuities period begins to run, no one knows what
consequences a trust will have years later. Because the rule operates
167. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 Real
Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 569, 580 n.23 (1986).
168. See id.
169. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
170. See Simes, supra note 39, at 709.
171. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
1260
Vol. 75:1237, 2000
Rule Against Perpetuities
blindly, it will terminate trusts even if they continue to have the
beneficial consequences the dead hands wished them to have.
The prescriptive (as opposed to reactive) nature of the rule also
mitigates the extent to which the rule strikes a fair balance between past,
present, and future control of property. 73 Whether or not a trust benefits
beneficiaries to the full extent possible within its terms depends on the
peculiarities of the trust, the changing economy, and how the two
interact. The rule, however, prescribes the same result for all cases no
matter how different they might be. Because fairness in a particular case
depends on the details of that case, the rule is fundamentally ill-suited to
the fair balancing of past, present, and future property rights.
In contrast to the rule, dead hand control will endure in a reactive
regime only as long as it is beneficial or innocuous. In the case of dead
hand control that restrains the alienability and hence productivity of
property, the point at which dead hand control should be terminated is
fairly clear. For example, suppose that a family is no longer able to
manage an apartment complex effectively, but is restrained from selling
it under the terms of a trust. After the family shows that it cannot manage
the property, a court could break the dead hand's grip and allow the
property to be sold. 74 In the case of accumulated land and capital wealth,
there will be a point beyond which it is against society's interest for the
estate to grow." s If a dead hand controls such wealth, perhaps preventing
a living beneficiary from donating money or property to charity or
selling land or assets, a court would terminate the dead hand's grip, at
least to the extent that it is in society's interest to put the land or assets
back into commercial circulation. This point might be reached within the
perpetuities period, or it might be reached well after the perpetuities
period has run. It is, of course, impossible to specify in the abstract when
a trust has grown to the point where society's interests are adversely
affected. The line will be crossed, however, when substantial numbers of
173. See Simes, supra note 39, at 723.
174. See Cal. Prob. Code § 15409 (West Supp. 1990). Section 15409 provides that on petition by
the trustees or beneficiaries, the court may modify the administrative or dispositive provisions of
trusts or terminate them if, owing to circumstances not known to, or anticipated by, the settlor,
continuation of the trust under its terms would defeat or substantially impair accomplishment of the
purposes of the trust. Under appropriate circumstances, the court may also order the trustee to do acts
forbidden by trust instrument. See Cal. Prob. Code § 15409.
175. This is an assumption that proponents of the rule are in no position to dispute. The
prevention-of-wealth-concentration policy the rule is intended to serve dependi on the assumption
that there is a point beyond which concentration of wealth affects society adversely. See supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text.
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people experience hardship as a result of the fact that a small group of
people control a large portion of the land or capital. At that point, public
policy demands that others be granted economic access to the property.
76
A comparison to antitrust law helps illuminate how a reactive regime
is better able to respond to threats of wealth accumulation and dead hand
control, and balance the rights of different generations. 77 To prevent the
anti-competitive consequences of monopolies, antitrust law imposes a
constraint on the size (measured in terms of market share) to which a
company may grow; specifically, companies may not grow so large that
they discourage competition. 78 Thus, the size of a company is expressly
limited by reference to the adverse consequences of monopolization. In
the case of private wealth accumulation of the sort targeted by the rule,
the law should similarly step in to protect society from the adverse
consequences that result from the lack of available land or capital. 79 It is
difficult to determine when a company has enough market share to
trigger the government's intervention, but that is no reason to restructure
antitrust law; monopolistic threats are handled as they threaten to reduce
competition. 8° Similarly, if it is difficult to determine when a family has
acquired too much wealth, or when a dead hand's restrictions are too
onerous, that is no reason to retain the rule; wealth monopolies should
also be handled as they give rise to negative consequences.
By parity of reasoning, if one favors the rule as the proper response to
the threat posed by private accumulation of wealth, then one should also
favor a bright-line rule that limits how long a company may endure
before being broken up as the proper response to the threat posed by
monopolies. That would be absurd in the case of commercial entities
because many companies never become monopolies; 8' it is only
appropriate to break them up if they threaten to derail competition. The
same is true in the case of private wealth accumulation. Most individuals
and families never accumulate wealth to a degree that harms society;'82 it
176. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 833.
177. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
178. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994) (condemning "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy
in restraint of trade" and everyone who shall "monopolize").
179. See Leach, supra note 1, at 726 (describing state statutes that prohibit certain types of
accumulations).
180. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
181. Cf Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 3.
182. See Leach, supra note 1, at 727.
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is only appropriate to eliminate dead hand controls that have adverse
social consequences when they actually have those consequences. In
both cases, to subscribe to an arbitrary limit on duration would be to
respond with unyielding finality to a hypothetical threat that may never
come to pass.
C. The Motivations for Repeal Are Superior to Those of the Major
Reform Movements
The motivations for repeal of the rule compare favorably to those of
the major reform movements. Repeal of the rule is supported by the fact
that extant legal mechanisms other than the rule respond directly to the
problems that trusts can cause, and do not impose a single, arbitrary
solution to all potential problems even before any problems have
developed; it is better to respond to problems appropriately only if and
when they arise. The main motivations behind two of the major reform
movements, the cy pres approach and the wait-and-see approach, are
similar; each reform movement also advocates dealing with trust
problems when they arise rather than in advance.'83 In important respects,
however, the motivations behind repeal of the rule differ from, and are
superior to, those behind the major reform movements.
Consider first a comparison to cy pres. Like the cy pres approach,
repeal of the rule would allow trusts to be modified to benefit
beneficiaries, with due attention paid to the intent of the settlor.', Under
the cy pres approach to reform, however, the event that triggers trust
modification is a violation of the rule.'85 Trusts are modified under cy
pres, then, not because they have detrimental effects, but simply because
they violate the rule.'86 This has two adverse consequences. First, even a
benign trust may violate the rule;87 therefore, the cy pres doctrine will
call for the modification of some trusts even when they have no
detrimental consequences. Second, because trust modification requires
court authority,' the cy pres approach imposes a needless tax on court
183. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text
184. See supra note 89 and accompanying text
185. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 676-88.
186. See id
187. See Leach, supra note 1, at 727 (stating that rule should not disrupt otherwise "reasonable"
trusts).
188. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 900.
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resources through judicial termination of benign trusts. If the rule were
repealed, trusts would be modified only if they have pernicious
consequences for beneficiaries or society generally. In this case,
however, the event that would trigger modification of the trust would be
an economic development that, for example, makes sale of trust assets
advisable.' 89 Repeal of the rule, then, would not arbitrarily terminate
benign trusts, and would call on courts to modify trusts only when
economically necessary. Repeal would reduce consumption of court
resources.
Consider next a comparison to the wait-and-see approach.'9 The idea
of this approach is to respond to hypothetical violations of the rule only
if they become actual violations. 9' But violations of the rule are not evil
in and of themselves; according to the policies behind the rule, 92
violations of the rule are evil only to the extent that they contribute to
problems such as excessive accumulation of private wealth or
unproductive use of property.'93 If the threats that the rule addresses do
not materialize during the perpetuities period, then it may not matter
whether any unvested interests remain contingent. Contingent future
interests are a problem only if they contribute to excessive wealth
accumulation or some other adverse consequence.' 94 If a contingent
future interest contributes to no such consequence by the time the
perpetuities period has run, then there is nothing to be gained from
invalidating it at that point. For example, if the dead hand restrictions on
the interest subsequently threaten to render land unproductive, then the
restrictions can be lifted at that point. The wait-and-see approach
correctly avoids abstract possibilities that never materialize, but its focus
is too narrow.9 ' The abstract possibilities to be avoided are the threats
the rule is designed to prevent (that is, wealth accumulation and
excessive dead hand control), not fantasies that would violate the rule
without giving rise to these threats. If one should "wait and see," then
189. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part I.C.2.
193. See id.
194. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 5, at 833.
195. This is not the only problem with the wait-and-see approach. Because it retains the feature of
the common law rule, according to which it can be determined that certain interests violate the rule
only after the perpetuities period has run, all of the problems regarding uncertainty about property
ownership remain. See Levin & Mulroney, supra note 49, at 348.
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one should wait to see if there is any need for the rule at all. If a trust
presents no threat of wealth accumulation or excessive dead hand
control, then it should not be invalidated even if some interest remained
unvested beyond the perpetuities period (in violation of the rule).
IV. CONCLUSION
Two of the substantive policies that the rule has traditionally served
are prevention of wealth disparities and prevention of excessive dead
hand control. The rule is no longer necessary to serve these policies
because the threats it identified are no longer pressing in the way they
once were, and because extant legal mechanisms are adequate to address
the threats that remain. Federal taxes, trustee law, and marketable-title
acts can curb wealth concentration, limit dead hand control, and
guarantee clean title even while trusts endure for many generations.
The rule also aims to strike a fair balance between the rights and
interests of past, present, and future generations. The rule's arbitrarily
prescribed limit on trusts, however, is by its very nature incapable of
achieving the fair balance at which it aims. Because the rule prescribes a
limit, it is necessarily insensitive to economic conditions that might
preserve the beneficial consequences of trusts that endure past the
perpetuities period. Reactive, court-ordered variations from trust terms,
however, can find context-sensitive results where the rule presumes that
one size fits all.
Many states have shifted from the rule's prescription of a single
solution to the problems of enduring trusts, to the reformers' reactive
approaches; the reform movements, however, have misidentified the
threats to which the law should be reacting. The reformers advocate
reacting to violations of the rule when they should advocate reacting to
the threats the rule was designed to address. Repealing the rule will focus
legal resources on the threats to which the rule was addressed rather than
the rule itself. Washington, therefore, should repeal the rule.
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